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Summary
The General Accounting Office (GAO)
has made recommendations for improving
the disability programs by citing practices
that have been successful in Germany,
Sweden, and the private sector.  This issue is
important in the United States because the
number of disability beneficiaries is growing
rapidly, program costs are increasing
proportionately, and few disability recipients
are leaving the disability rolls to resume
work activity. GAO points out that the
estimated lifetime savings for removing an
additional 1 percent of the disabled benefi-
ciaries from the rolls of the Disability
Insurance (DI) and the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs each year
will ultimately reach $3.0 billion.
GAO cites three specific practices as
showing the most promise for returning the
disabled to work.  They are (1) intervening
as soon as possible after a disabling event to
promote and facilitate return to work, (2)
identifying and providing necessary return-
to-work assistance and managing cases to
achieve return-to-work goals, and (3)
structuring cash and health benefits to
encourage people with disabilities to return
to work.  This article examines these
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suggestions to improve the rate of
rehabilitation of disabled workers using
research by experts on return-to-work
practices in Germany, Sweden, and the
United States.
Experts caution that any consideration
of borrowing practices from other coun-
tries needs to take into account the unique
economic, social, and political elements in
each country.  Although other countries
appear to be very successful in their
rehabilitation programs, practices that are
successful in one country may not neces-
sarily work well in another.  Countries
have different definitions of disability and
payment structures.  The existence of
temporary and partial awards in Germany
and Sweden may ensure a number of
easily rehabilitated individuals, while the
U.S. vocational rehabilitation (VR)
agencies have been mandated to focus on
only the most severely disabled individu-
als.  Public expenditures for vocational
rehabilitation, work for the disabled, and
disability benefits are much higher as a
percentage of gross domestic product in
Germany and Sweden than they are in the
United States.  Compared with the United
States, Germany spent twice as much for
VR, and Sweden spent 2.6 times more.
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This article examines
suggestions by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to
improve the rate of rehabili-
tation of workers on the
disability rolls. It examines
GAO’s suggestions within the
context of research by experts
on return-to-work practices
in Germany, Sweden, and the
United States.  It also
discusses lessons learned
from the European experi-
ences and current and past
return-to-work initiatives
used in the Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) and
Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) programs.
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Impediments to GAO’s suggestions include divergent goals of
the Social Security program and VR agencies, lack of availability
of VR services, the timing of VR referral (which is significantly
later than the onset of the disability), and little incentive for
return to work built into the payment structure.
The Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 is currently
being considered by a Congressional conference committee.
The bill would establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency
program and would require or authorize the Social Security
Administration to demonstrate and evaluate different ways of
encouraging return to work.  In designing these demonstrations,
early intervention after a potentially disabling illness or injury
is an approach that merits serious attention.
Introduction
In the 10-year period from 1987 through 1996, the number of
working-age disabled beneficiaries grew from 2.8 million to 4.4
million in the DI program and from 2.1 million to 3.5 million in the
SSI program.  In 1996, DI benefits cost $39.6 billion, up from
$18.0 billion in 1987, and federal SSI benefits cost $21.8 billion,
up from $7.8 billion in 1987.1 Part of this growth has occurred
because few disabled workers leave the program due to
resumption of work activity.  In fact, for fiscal year 1996, only
6,024 workers referred by SSA were rehabilitated by state
Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) agencies. 2  Improving return-to-
work strategies is important because the estimated lifetime
savings for an additional 1 percent of the DI and SSI beneficia-
ries leaving the rolls is $3 billion.3  GAO has suggested that
return-to-work strategies employed by Germany and Sweden
hold potential for getting disabled Americans back to work.
GAO recommendations are:
• Intervene as soon as possible after an actual or poten-
tially disabling event to promote and facilitate return to
work;
• Identify and provide necessary return to work assistance
and manage cases to achieve return to work goals;  and
• Structure cash and health benefits to encourage people
with disabilities to return to work.
Any consideration of borrowing social insurance practices
from other countries should include an analysis of the unique
economic, social, and political elements in each country.
Policies in any environment must be understood within that
context before they are considered for use elsewhere. It is also
important to recognize that all countries concede that their own
social insurance programs have room for improvement.
Research has shown that Germany, Sweden, and the United
States have attempted to make improvements in their disability
programs over the years by introducing new requirements,
practices, and incentives.  Some of these have proven to be
successful over time and others have not.  Unfortunately,
comparable data on reintegration (returning the disabled to
work) from the three countries is difficult to obtain.  It is also
difficult to pinpoint any specific new practices that might have
improved the statistics since new practices are rarely adopted in
isolation.  The governments of Germany and Sweden have also
recently passed legislation to make incremental changes
through the year 2000.  The impact of these legislative changes
will take years to assess.
This article examines suggestions made by GAO to improve
the rate of rehabilitation of workers on the DI/SSI disability
rolls.  A brief discussion of some unique aspects of the Euro-
pean systems will provide a framework for an examination of
the feasibility of GAO’s suggestions. The article also discusses
past lessons learned from the European experiences and current
and past return-to-work initiatives used in the DI and SSI
programs.
Definitions of Disability
The U.S. national disability insurance program has the most
restrictive definition of disability of the three countries.  To
receive benefits, an applicant must demonstrate an inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
physical or mental medically determinable impairment that is
expected to last at least 12 months or result in death.  In ad-
dition, the impairment must be of such severity that the person
is not only unable to do his previous work, but considering his
age, education, and work experience, is unable to do any other
kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy.
In Germany, disabled persons are those who are “limited in
their capacity for integration into society because of the effects
of a physical, mental, or psychological condition which is
contrary to the norm, and where limitation of this capacity for
reintegration is not merely of a temporary nature…The serious-
ness of limitation is expressed as a ‘degree of disability’ in
increments of ten degrees between 20 and 100.”4
In Sweden, a disability “is not looked upon as a characteris-
tic of a person, caused by injury or illness, but as a relationship
between the person and the work environment…It is only when
the disability entails an impediment in relation to a certain kind
of work that reference can be made to an occupational disabil-
ity.  A jobseeker has an occupational disability if, as a result of
an impairment, medical condition or illness of a physical,
mental, or intellectual or social nature, he or she has, or is
expected to have difficulties in obtaining or retaining gainful
employment.”5
An examination of these definitions shows that the United
States’ definition of disability is of a full and complete disable-
ment, whereas both Germany and Sweden recognize lesser
degrees of impairment or disablement.  Appropriately, those
countries with definitions of disability that recognize degree of
impairment award partial benefits based on degree, while the
United States pays only a full benefit amount to those meeting
its criteria.
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Programs in Germany and Sweden
Guiding Policies
Sweden’s disability policy has political, economic, and social
goals.  The political goal, formulated by the government in 1976,
is “to make society accessible for all, to provide disabled
persons the opportunity to participate in the social community,
and to live in a manner, to such a degree as possible, equivalent
to others.”6 The aim is full participation and equality for all of
its citizens.  Responsibility for achieving this objective is
shared by society as a whole.  The labor market policy is based
on the principle of universal entitlement to work, and an
emphasis has been placed on young people, minorities, the
disabled, and the long-term unemployed.  Sweden’s emphasis
has historically been on a strong work ethic and full employ-
ment.
In Germany, there is a social right addressing the disabled:
“any person who is physically, mentally or psychologically
disabled, or who is threatened by such a disability, has a social
right independent of the cause of disability, to the assistance
which is necessary in order to avert, eliminate, or ease the
disability, prevent its aggravation or to reduce its effects and to
secure a place in the community, in particular in working life, in
accordance with his or her inclinations and abilities.”  Four
principles are emphasized:7
• Enabling people to live as normally and independently as
possible, depending as little as possible on social ben-
efits.  This principle implies avoiding the creation of
special facilities and laws targeting the rights of disabled
people only;
• Offering necessary assistance to every disabled person
and person threatened by disability, regardless of the
cause of disability, even when responsibility for this
assistance is held by a number of different funds and
institutions whose eligibility requirements for the
provisions of assistance vary;
• Intervening at the earliest possible stage in order to
minimize the degree and effects of disability and to
compensate as far as possible for unavoidable effects;
and
• Tailoring individual assistance to the needs and situation
of each individual disabled or threatened by disability.
Rehabilitation Services
Under Sweden’s General Insurance Act, employers are
required to report any employee receiving more than 4 weeks
of consecutive sickness benefits to the social insurance office.
The employer, employee, and the social insurance office share
responsibility for beginning a rehabilitation plan.
The Swedish Social Insurance Service and its regional and
local offices may buy services for their clients from any
approved training service.  Some rehabilitation services offer
different kinds of VR programs, while others specialize in
certain types of disabilities. VR providers differ greatly in
terms of measures taken and results achieved, mainly because
of differences in clientele due to specialized programs.  Spe-
cific occupational training is conducted under the same
programs for the disabled as the nondisabled.
In Germany, impaired workers are referred for rehabilitation
by adjudicators of the sickness insurance system, the disability
pensions, or the local employment agencies.  A wide variety of
programs are designed to reintegrate workers into the labor
force when they are ready, including wage subsidies, job
modifications, technical aids, transportation allowances, and a
variety of other assistive devices.  There are also provisions for
part-time reintegration into the workforce while receiving partial
benefits.
The physician is part of the rehabilitation process in Ger-
many.  Physicians are required to adhere to published guide-
lines for the treatment and rehabilitation of persons with
specific illnesses and injuries.  Guidelines deal with definitive
treatment, recommendations for exercise and general exertion,
ways to persuade the patient to apply for rehabilitation services,
formulation of support groups, and the role of work in the life
of a patient.
Trends and Program Changes
In the 1980s, the incidence of absence from work in Sweden
increased considerably. In an attempt to stop this trend in
growth, benefit levels were reduced and more responsibility
was placed on employers and individuals to achieve a quicker
return to work.  Money was diverted from funding sickness
benefits to procuring rehabilitation services.  During the 1990-
91 period, the primary responsibility for identifying and
determining the need for rehabilitation was placed on employ-
ers.  Since 1990, the number of people who are compensated
through the public sickness insurance system has declined
almost by half due to more restrictive rules and practices.
These include more restrictive requirements concerning
medical documentation, sickness payments for the first 2 weeks
being moved from the general social insurance system to the
employer, and the compensation level decreasing from 90
percent of income to a sliding scale that decreases the benefit
over time.
The role of Sweden’s Social Insurance Service personnel
changed in 1992.  For the first time, the role of these employees
was expanded to a more active role in rehabilitation.  They
were required to have personal contact with every workplace
and play an active part in preventive measures as well as
encouraging early and active rehabilitation for ill and injured
workers.
Prior to 1996, all disabled persons in Germany had a legal
claim to vocational rehabilitation benefits.  The Growth and
Employment Act (January 1997) changed this arrangement so
that VR for new claims is decided on a case-by-case basis.
Tighter management of claims will be pursued, and rehabilita-
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tion benefits will be limited to 1993 expenditure levels.8  Effec-
tive in 2000, disability pensions will no longer be liberalized or
tightened based on the labor market situation.  The benefit for
occupational incapacity (a partial incapacity of at least 50
percent) will be removed from the pension system and priva-
tized.
Major Programmatic Differences
In Germany and Sweden, virtually all workers are covered
by social health insurance that does not terminate with the loss
of employment.  This situation does not prevail in the United
States.  Many U.S. workers lose their medical benefits when
they leave their place of employment or must pay high premi-
ums to maintain them.  When a finding of disability is made,
the SSI beneficiary is automatically entitled to Medicaid
coverage because of limited income and resources, and the DI
beneficiary is entitled to Medicare enrollment after 24 months.
Medicaid coverage can be extended indefinitely to lower
income SSI workers under Section 1619 (b) of the Social
Security Act, and Medicare coverage for DI workers can
continue for 39 months after successful completion of the trial
work period.  Beneficiaries terminated from either Medicare or
Medicaid may have difficulty finding coverage through private
insurance companies and employer-based insurance programs
that do not cover the individual for pre-existing conditions.
Many researchers believe that the disabled have often been
frightened of returning to work and risking the loss of Medicare
or Medicaid coverage in the absence of comparable private
coverage.9  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 made access to health care more available to
workers with pre-existing conditions by limiting insurance
companies to a 12 month maximum exclusion period for these
enrollees.
In Germany and Sweden, measures are in place for payment
of temporary sickness benefits prior to a determination of
disability.  The term of these payments is flexible.  Partial
benefits may be paid to an individual who is still able to
maintain part-time employment.  The sickness benefit payment
period is often used to pursue rehabilitation services prior to
either a full return to work or disability pension determination.
The U.S. Social Security programs do not include a partial
benefit award.  Instead, they grant a benefit that can be termi-
nated for successful return to work or medical improvement, or
reduced by the amount of some other benefit that is based on
the same disability.
It is significant that Germany and Sweden have historically
paid a higher percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP)
for their programs than the United States.  Expenditures for the
disabled in both Germany and Sweden far exceed those of the
U.S. disability program.  Table 1 shows the percentage of GDP
spent by each country for rehabilitation, work for the disabled
(sheltered workshops and other employment programs), and
disability benefits.  However, it should be noted that the United
States has the highest ratio of VR expenditures to disability
benefits of the three countries.
Table 2 shows that Social Security contributions rates have
also been much higher in the European countries.  The taxation
rate for U.S. workers falls considerbly short of both Germany
and Sweden.
Because of the differences in the programs, how they are
implemented, and how success is defined, it is difficult to cite
the practices or combination of practices that contribute to the
success or relative failure of return-to-work practices in
Germany, Sweden, and the United States.  The statistics for
successful return to work or reintegration for each of the
countries are also difficult to compare since the definitions of
success are different. The published success rates of the
Rehabilitation Services Administration, the federal oversight
organization for the state VR agencies in the United States, are
not comparable to the published success rates of the European
countries because Germany and Sweden include the unem-
ployed, first-time workers, and those needing training in a new
field as well as the disabled population.  However, the rehabili-
tation rates of disability cases referred to the VR agencies in the
United States fall far short of the national rehabilitation
statistics for VR services.  In 1995, approximately 1.3 million
individuals were served by the state VR agencies annually, and
approximately 200,000 (15.4 percent) were successfully
rehabilitated,10 yet only 6,238 (0.5 percent) were considered
successfully rehabilitated disability claimants.11
Table 2.—Social Security contribution rates for the average 
worker1
Country Total
Insured 
person Employer
Germany.................. 20.30 10.15 10.15
Sweden.................... 20.06 1.0 19.06
United States........... 12.40 6.2 6.2
   
1U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs
Throughout the World—1997 , Washington, DC.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1997.
Table 1.—Public expenditures on labor market measures 
for the disabled and cash benefits, as a percentage of 
GDP, 19911
Country
Vocational 
rehabilitation
Work for the 
disabled
Disability 
benefits
Germany.................. 0.13 0.09 2.0
Sweden.................... .10 .68 3.3
United States........... .05 (2) .7
     1Leo J. M. Aarts and Philip R. DeJong, "European Experiences
with Disability Policy," in Disability, Work and Cash Benefits , 
J. Mashaw; V. Reno; R. Burkhauser;  and M. Barques (eds.), Michigan: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    2Less than 0.01 percent.
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A 1998 International Labour Organization (ILO) project that
studied different return-to-work strategies in several countries
shows some interesting differences between countries that the
statistics alone do not reflect.  For instance, while the VR
system in the United States concentrates on rehabilitating the
most severely disabled individuals, the German system has
been criticized for “creaming,” or accepting a high percentage
of individuals who are skilled workers with minor health
impairments while rejecting older and more severely disabled
individuals.12  In Sweden, disabled persons represent only 30
percent of all persons who take part in the National Labour
Market Board’s range of measures.13  The other participants in
the range of measures receive mostly vocational training and
are not disabled.
A Discussion of the GAO Recommendations
Intervene as Early as Possible After an Actual
or Potentially Disabling Event
GAO suggests that SSA should assist the applicant with
access to rehabilitation as early as possible using the following
practices:  (1) address return to work goals from the beginning
of an emerging disability;  (2) provide return-to-work services
at the earliest appropriate time; and (3) maintain communica-
tion with workers who are hospitalized or recovering at home.
The notion of early intervention has gained popularity
among medical and social insurance professionals because any
delay in offering rehabilitation tends to encourage applicants to
focus on their disability rather than their residual ability or
potential.  Edward E. Palmer has noted that “time itself is a
debilitating factor…As time passes individual motivation
wanes and psychological barriers to returning to a normal work
situation are erected, more or less subconsciously.”14  In
Germany and Sweden, laws and policies require that an
individual’s potential for returning to work be assessed soon
after the onset of a disabling condition.  In Germany, early
assistance in rehabilitation is a guiding principle and rehabilita-
tion is considered before payment of benefits.15  Sweden’s
recent policy emphasis has been on early intervention and
policy coordination of all parties involved in rehabilitation.
In Germany, physicians of the sickness insurance agency
counsel and refer individuals for rehabilitation even for an
emerging disability.  Rehabilitation authorities have published
guidelines for the treatment and rehabilitation of specific
conditions.  These guidelines include definitive treatment,
recommendations for exercise, and ways to persuade the
individual to apply for rehabilitation services.  If the individual
does not need to be referred immediately, the sickness insur-
ance agency has a legal obligation to notify the pension benefit
insurance agency after a worker uses 6 weeks of sick leave.
Despite Germany’s guiding principle of “rehabilitation before
pension,” there is evidence of compromise in the German
system.  Germany has had problems supplying rehabilitation
services despite promises that they are available and a priority.
Research has suggested that the principle of early intervention
is not always followed.  Studies conducted in 1988 and 1990
show that rehabilitation was often never begun or that mea-
sures were not undertaken for a long period of time.16  Many
people received pensions well before, or instead of, rehabilita-
tion.  A major reason for this problem seems to be inadequate
availability of services available due to “fragmentation of
authority across competing agencies.”17   Funding of rehabilita-
tion services is linked to social insurance contributions, thus
the lower the employment rate, the lower the contributions and
therefore the lower the rehabilitation services budget for
growing numbers of the disabled.
Facilitating early return to work has become a major policy
objective in Sweden.  In the 1990s, the emphasis has been to
give employers and employees more responsibility to achieve
quicker return to work.  This policy was practical because
approximately 75 percent of employees either work for large
companies with on-site doctors and physical therapists or for a
company with an affiliation with a medical center.18   The
employers’ physicians monitor cases from the beginning of an
illness or injury, and are therefore strategically placed to initiate
any needed early intervention. Employers are now required to
help create a rehabilitation plan for the employee 8 weeks into
the illness or injury.
In Germany and Sweden, maintaining communication with
the disabled worker during hospitalization and recovery is
deemed important.  This case management technique is used by
private insurance companies and employers that are involved in
rehabilitation efforts.  Surveys have shown that participants like
this personal touch feature.  Case managers may actually view
it as a motivational tool used to encourage the worker to get
back to work.
Identify and Provide Assistance Effectively
GAO challenges SSA to address each individual’s return-to-
work potential and needs, use case management techniques
when appropriate to help workers with disabilities to return to
work, offer transitional work opportunities that enable workers
with disabilities to ease back into the workplace, and ensure
that medical service providers understand the essential job
functions of workers with disabilities.
One of the principles of rehabilitation policy in Germany is
“individual assistance tailored to the actual needs and situation
of each individual disabled or threatened by disability.”  The
physician in the local pension benefit agency decides the best
path to be taken for each disabled person:  whether he or she
can be expected to recover without intervention, whether the
decision should be delayed to await further developments, or
whether the person should be referred for rehabilitation.  If
rehabilitation is chosen, a panel of doctors at the pension
insurance agency decides whether medical or vocational
rehabilitation is appropriate, or if a disability pension should be
granted.  Assessments and training generally take 6 to 12
months, but may take up to 2 years for a severely impaired
individual.
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Sweden began following Germany’s example in 1992.
Although the emphasis was to encourage earlier return to work,
more responsibility was placed on social insurance officers.
For the first time, they were required to coordinate rehabilita-
tive efforts of medical and vocational professionals.19  This new
emphasis on case management imposed a more public role for
these employees by requiring field visits to workplaces and
health centers.  Because the government established new cost-
cutting goals for sickness and disability benefits, social
insurance administrators have had to “act more as private
insurers with a responsibility to contain costs.”20
Another proposed focus of the disability program concerns
identifying the services needed.  These services, by German
and Swedish examples, should be extensive and tailored to
individual circumstances that help to achieve return-to-work
goals for workers with disabilities while avoiding unnecessary
expenditures.  A mental and/or physical assessment is made for
each candidate’s potential to return to work, and rehabilitation
services are designed to best accommodate the individual.
Germany and Sweden provide transitional work opportuni-
ties for those attempting to re-enter the workforce.  In Germany,
a stepwise reintegration initiative helps workers to return to
their original employment.21  By this plan, workers and their
employers may enter into a contract that stipulates dates of the
reintegration process, salary, expected progress of the workers,
and any criteria for contract termination. Workers can return to
their prior work at a gradual pace, allaying fears that they are
ready to return to work on a full-time basis.
In the European countries, medical service providers
understand the essential job functions of workers with disabili-
ties.  In Sweden, there is a close relationship between the
sickness insurance agency and physicians.  In Germany,
education in rehabilitation for physicians has been a
longstanding practice.  Guidelines have been published to stress
the rehabilitation aspects of medicine.  By law, a physician is
obliged to explain the importance of rehabilitation and explain
the steps to be taken and the benefits that can be achieved.
Structuring Cash and Health
Benefits to Encourage Return to Work
GAO suggests restructuring cash and health benefits
because the current structure often presents more hindrances
than incentives to returning to work.  It also suggests that SSA
implement a contractual agreement with the disability recipient
requiring complete cooperation with a return-to-work plan as a
condition of eligibility for benefits.  This requirement would
motivate claimants to try to return to work.
As previously mentioned, a major difference between the
U.S. disability programs and those of Germany and Sweden is
that the European workers maintain health insurance coverage,
and provisions are made for a sickness benefit prior to the
determination of long-term disability.  Proponents of this
system argue that while receiving temporary sickness benefits,
beneficiaries can focus on their efforts on rehabilitation without
facing loss of income and health insurance.  Since the sickness
benefit is temporary, workers know that they need to concen-
trate on rehabilitation. Unfortunately, empirical data supporting
the notion that benefit structures in German and Swedish
programs encourage or support return to work better than the
U.S. programs are lacking.  Also, Germany and Sweden have
been just as busy as the United States in considering reform to
alleviate potential crises in their programs.22
For example, beginning in 1992, Swedish workers partici-
pating in rehabilitation activities were paid an additional cash
benefit allowance of 100 percent of lost earnings.  This rate was
eventually recognized as overly generous and not conducive to
returning an individual to work.  It was gradually phased out
and finally abolished in 1996.23  Germany is also imposing a
time limited benefit to replace the existing permanent pension
benefit,24 thereby making automatic continuance of the benefit
or rollover to a pension more difficult.
Germany and Sweden require cooperation in rehabilitation
efforts by the disabled person, and GAO has suggested that a
contractual provision should be made with the disabled worker
to require his or her participation in return-to-work efforts.
While the Social Security Act already provides for withholding
of benefits for refusal, without good cause, to accept these
services, there is little opportunity to enforce it since so few
cases referred by SSA are accepted by the VR program.
Impediments to Adopting
GAO’s Recommendations
GAO recognizes that in order to implement its proposals,
SSA may need to take the lead in coordinating efforts by many
agencies, including the Department of Labor, the Department of
Education, the states, and the private sector.  For example, it
suggests that a cooperative effort to provide opportunities for
transitional employment be established to assist beneficiaries in
slowly moving back into the workforce.  Currently, no require-
ments or incentives are in place to make transitional employ-
ment available in the U.S. disability programs.  The Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) has created programs avail-
able to disability recipients, but they must compete for re-
sources with other groups of disadvantaged individuals.25   The
establishment of new transitional employment programs would
be a major initiative and require years and special funding to
initiate.
Establishing a new transitional employment program only
for disability beneficiaries does not hold a great deal of promise
for success.  Transitional employment models tested by SSA
may not be cost effective.26 Germany, Sweden, and private
insurers in the United States are able to capitalize on the
existing employer-employee relationship, but many workers in
the United States who file for disability have been away from
work for an extended period of time.  Any opportunities for
flexible relationships with their previous employer have most
likely disappeared.
The most relevant example of a partnership between govern-
mental agencies is the relationship between the disability
programs and state Vocational Rehabilitation programs.
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A complicating factor in this relationship is that SSA and
vocational rehabilitation have divergent definitions of success-
ful rehabilitation: Vocational rehabilitation deems success when
an individual returns to work for 60 days, but SSA has a more
complex definition.  SSA sees a work attempt as successful
only when a claimant has “substantial” earnings for 9 months.
Rehabilitation success is more difficult to achieve for disability
recipients, and VR counselors “tend to shy away from them.”27
Edward Berkowitz and David Dean argue that Congress
mandated a relationship between SSA and vocational rehabilita-
tion despite divergent views of disability inherent in the
programs and without serious analysis.28  According to
MonroeBerkowitz, “The limited effectiveness of the public VR
system in taking persons off the rolls is not surprising.  The VR
programs have found other clientele, as Congress has asked
them to concentrate on the disadvantaged, the mentally ill,
persons with mental retardation, and persons with severe
disabilities.”29  An ILO Study Report finds that “The federal-
state VR program changed its emphasis in 1974 from serving the
person most likely to benefit from services to those persons
with severe disabilities.  As a result, states with limited funding
are often forced to invoke an ‘order of selection’ which stipu-
lated that persons with less severe disabling conditions be put
on a waiting list.”30
GAO has suggested that SSA incorporate techniques used in
the private sector and other countries where employers are
involved in the case and have a vested interest in the worker.
The structures of the private and social insurance programs in
Germany and Sweden differ from those of the United States,
and that difference makes borrowing their practices difficult.
For instance, SSA’s disability application process provides no
early rehabilitation referral, and very little subsequent referral.
There is often a significant time lapse between the date that
workers ended their employment and the date of filing for
benefits: 42 percent of SSI applicants reported leaving their last
job more than 12 months before applying for benefits and 27
percent did not know when they left their last job.  Nearly half
of DI and SSI applicants have not worked for more than 6
months before filing.31 In some cases, the employer may have
already exercised case management practices unsuccessfully
before the claimant filed for disability benefits.
Currently a state VR agency screens an applicant after all
evidence has been received and the claimant’s disability
determination is prepared. This can occur between 30 and 180
(or more) days after an application is initially filed, and longer
when the decision is appealed.  The optimum period for early
intervention may have already passed by the time an applicant
walks into the Social Security office. The current program re-
fers the claimant only after the lengthy wait for a decision, but
only half of the workers with recently acquired disabilities who
are out of work for 5 months or more will ever return to work.32
Current and Future Directions
SSA currently has initiatives in place and before Congress to
improve the rate of return to work among disability recipients.
Some examples are:
• Project ABLE operates through the joint efforts of
several federal agencies.  It provides a national resume
bank of qualified individuals on the disability rolls who
want to work.  It has provided an easily accessible
applicant pool to employers through OPM (Office of
Personnel Management).
• Project RSVP was initiated to enable an outside contrac-
tor to manage SSA’s VR referral and reimbursement
system.  The objective is to make services more readily
available to our disabled clients and to improve the
administration and cost effectiveness of the program.
• SSA has implemented the use of alternate VR providers
that can supply needed employment and rehabilitation
services when the state VR offices do not accept the
referral.  To date, over 400 providers have signed
contracts to provide these services.
The Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 1180
and S 331) is currently being considered by a Congressional
conference committee.  The bill would establish a Ticket to
Work and a Self-Sufficiency program, in which disabled
beneficiaries would receive a voucher to use with any partici-
pating public or private provider of employment or rehabilita-
tion services.  The bill would also extend Medicare coverage
for DI beneficiaries who return to work and would expand state
options under the Medicaid program for workers with disabili-
ties.
The bill would require or authorize SSA to conduct several
evaluations and demonstrations.  It would require an evaluation
of the cost effectiveness of the Ticket to Work program and its
effect and self-sufficiency. It would also require the agency to
conduct demonstration projects providing for a gradual
reduction of disability benefits based on earnings.  Finally, the
bill would extend SSA’s authority to conduct additional
demonstrations designed to encourage rehabilitation and return
to work.  In designing demonstration projects under this new
authority, SSA will carefully consider the recommendations
made by GAO and the experiences of other countries.  Both
sources suggest that early intervention after a potentially
disabling illness or injury is an approach that merits serious
attention.
What Can be Done to
Increase Return to Work
A recent survey conducted by GAO indicated that some
beneficiaries felt that the 9-month trial work period was too
short and the $200 earnings level was too low to help them ease
back into full-time work.33  GAO has cited research to suggest
that receipt of DI benefits is associated with lower success in
return-to-work interventions.34  Hennessey’s 1997 article also
cited findings suggesting that a person with knowledge of the
work incentive provisions to help transition beneficiaries to full-
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time work has the same tendency to start work as someone who
does not, but is less able to sustain it.35  Hoynes and Moffitt36
admit that the scope of empirical literature on work incentives is
limited, but  that more generous trial work periods and extended
periods of eligibility provide a strong incentive to work at levels
below substantial gainful activity (SGA).
For workers who are concerned about the availability of
medical coverage for existing conditions, returning to work
may be a difficult choice.  Until recently, many private insur-
ance carriers excluded pre-existing medical conditions from
coverage.  Even the newest laws concerning private health care
coverage permit exclusion for up to 1 year.  Once workers are on
the disability rolls and entitled to medical coverage, they may
find the security of benefits difficult to abandon. Berkowitz
describes an “equilibrium” position where workers who have
spent time waiting for benefits and attain them has no great
incentive to change.37  SSI recipients can continue Medicaid
benefits without cost when they return to work, until their
earnings are sufficient to compensate for the value of benefits
received. DI beneficiaries must be on the disability rolls for 24
months prior to Medicare enrollment.38  If they become entitled
to Medicare benefits and return to work by completing the trial
work period and earning over $700 monthly,39 cash benefits are
suspended but health coverage continues for at least 39
months.  After this, there is an option to buy continuing
Medicare coverage at a rate of $309 monthly for Hospital
Insurance (Part A) and $45.50 monthly for Supplementary
Medical Insuranace (Part B) (1999 rates).  In the absence of
available private insurance that provides comparable coverage
without high premiums, beneficiaries may choose to discon-
tinue efforts to sustain work. These factors suggest that the
goal should be to make resumption of work more attractive than
benefits.40
Case management techniques are embraced by the private
sector and in the programs of other countries.  GAO has cited
favorable results found in both the private insurance sector and
the social insurance programs of Germany and Sweden.  Hunt
et al.41  have summarized essential components of successful
disability management techniques identified in research
literature.  These components include early contact with the
claimants and their doctor, early rehabilitation referral, and the
use of incentives in benefit design to encourage participation.
There is evidence to support that screening criteria for VR
referral developed by SSA should aim at cutting costs so that
rehabilitation will not be offered to poor risk and poorly
motivated individuals.  Research in Germany, Sweden, and the
United States on cohorts with back disorders points to certain
screening criteria that lend themselves to successful rehabilita-
tion.42 They include such factors as age, sex, education, the
nature of the medical problem, income, occupation, work-
related demands, presence of other chronic diseases, type of
medical provider, and medical interventions.  Further results of
the Work Incapacity and Reintegration (WIR) studies can be
used as a guide to better gauge these factors for use as
screening criteria on back and other impairments.
The contractual agreement for VR participation cited by
GAO could have a strong psychological effect on VR appli-
cants.  If applicants understand that they must sign a contract
agreeing to mandatory vocational rehabilitation prior to
receiving benefits, their energies may be more focused on the
opportunity to improve their future rather than on being
sustained minimally by the government.
A demonstration project conducted by SSA, Project
NetWork, allowed case managers in four different models to
counsel SSI applicants and DI and SSI recipients while they
pursued rehabilitation services.  These case managers used
techniques similar to the German and Swedish models.  Data
from this project of volunteer applicants and awardees provides
some insights but little support for the use of case management
techniques.
Without the availability of VR services for all qualified
applicants, the GAO suggestions would have a little chance to
succeed. Fortunately, SSA has recently initiated a program to
make other qualified public or private employment or rehabili-
tation providers available if a state VR program does not accept
a referral.  The inclusion of private rehabilitation providers will
help overcome the problem of an overburdened state VR
system.
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